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Jérôme PELLETIER†
ABSTRACT
According to many realist philosophers of fiction, one needs to posit an ontology of existing
fictional characters in order to give a correct account of discourse about fiction. The realists’
claim is opposed by pretense theorists for whom discourse about fiction involves, as discourse
in fiction, pretense. On that basis, pretense theorists claim that one does not need to embrace
an ontology of fictional characters to give an account of discourse about fiction. The ontolog-
ical dispute between realists and pretense theorists is mainly a dispute in the realm of the phi-
losophy of language concerning the status relative to pretense of discourse about fiction.
Realists are persuaded that there is a sharp line between discourse in fiction and discourse
about fiction while pretense theorists deny there exists such a line. I suggest that realists may
have a wrong picture of discourse in fiction since, in many cases, discourse in fiction already
contains many occurrences of discourse about fiction. Consequently, discourse about fiction,
instead of ending fiction, should be regarded, following pretense theorists, as adding extra lay-
ers of fiction.
1. The language dependent realist’s motivation
Realists about fictional characters claim that there are fictional characters, that
objects like Sherlock Holmes and Anna Karenina do literally exist and that the
names “Sherlock Holmes” and “Anna Karenina”, at least in some of their uses,
do literally refer to these objects.
Some among realists take fictional characters to be created by our linguis-
tic practices.1 Let’s call this kind of realism “language dependent realism”. In
what follows I consider the motivation behind such realism concerning fic-
tional characters. In particular, I do not consider the motivations of realists
from a Platonist or Meinongian tradition who treat fictional characters as
objects that exist independently of all linguistic practices.2
What does motivate language dependent realism about fictional charac-
ters? Essentially the view that certain sentences spoken or written about works
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of fiction are uttered literally and truthfully. These sentences generally involve
either names of fictional characters in subject position or existential quanti-
fiers and often contain “literary” predicates like “is a character”, “is fictional”,
“appears in”, “is partly modeled on”. Examples of such sentences are:
(1) “Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character”
(2) “The character of Falstaff has a long history in comic drama” (Evans
1982, 367)
(3) “There is a fictional character who, for every novel, either appears in
that novel or is a model for a character who does” (van Inwagen 2000,
243)
Language dependent realists do not see any compelling reasons for supposing
that such sentences about fiction are not uttered literally and truthfully. Con-
sider the following:
“Mr Slope is the villain of Barchester Towers’, ‘Mr Slope was one of Trollope’s most
felicitous creation’, ‘Mr Slope was modelled on a well-known bishop’s chaplain’,
‘Mr Slope is emulated by a host of college chaplains’. Propositions of this sort can
truthfully be made; they are not lines from Barchester Towers, and they cannot be
truthfully prefixed by ‘In the novel…’. (Barnes 1972, 50)
Such remarks cannot be prefixed by ‘in the story’, and their truth conditions are not
the contents of the story but empirical reality. (Crittenden 1991, 95)
"It is critical theories that tell us that there are fictional objects, because it is critical
theories alone that contain sentences like these: 
‘There are characters in some nineteenth-century novels who are presented with a
greater wealth of physical detail than is any character in any eighteenth-century
novel.’
‘Some characters in novels are closely modeled on actual people, while others are
wholly products of the literary imagination, and it is usually impossible to tell which
characters fall into which of these categories by textual analysis alone.’
‘Since nineteenth-century English novelists were, for the most part, conventional
Englishmen, we might expect most novels of the period to contain stereotyped comic
Frenchmen or Italians; but very few such characters exist.’
Such sentences can be vehicles of objective truth as surely as can the most humdrum
sentences about rocks and chemicals and numbers. (van Inwagen 1977, 73)
2. The pretense theorists’ reply.
Pretense theorists3 defend anti-objectualist views concerning fictional charac-
ters and reject the language dependent realists’ claim that one must embrace
an ontology of fictional characters to give an account of statements concern-
ing fiction. For pretense theorists, names of fictional characters are empty
names and sentences containing empty names like (1) and (2) or what appears
to be quantifications over a domain of fictional characters like (3), taken lit-
erally, do not express any proposition:
3 See, e.g., Evans 1982, 363-368, Walton 1990, 385-430, Recanati 2000, 214-226.
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If there is no Gulliver and there are no Lilliputians, there are no propositions about
them. So there would seem to be no such thing as the proposition that Gulliver was
captured by the Lilliputians. (Walton 1990, 391)
Still pretense theorists claim that a speaker may, in the context of statements
concerning fiction and of other “unofficial” games of make-believe4, pretend
that sentences like (1)–(3) express a proposition and may pretend to be assert-
ing a proposition by means of these sentences. Most important: pretense the-
orists claim that they can give an account of our intuitions concerning the
truth-evaluability of sentences (1)-(3), intuitions which motivate the realists to
adopt an ontology of fictional characters. Walton, one of the leading pretense
theorists, presents the task of pretense theorists in the following way:
Our task is to explain what is being asserted in these cases. (The question is not what
the sentences themselves mean or what propositions they express. My position is that
the sentences have no meanings beyond their ordinary literal ones, and I prefer to
regard those appearing to denote purely fictional entities as not expressing proposi-
tions at all.) (Walton 1990, 396)5
In discourse about fiction, at least as it is understood by pretense theorists, the
speaker while pretending to make an assertion with (1)–(3) really asserts
something about the particular role of these sentences in make-believe. The
speaker in pretending to assert (1)–(3) indicates or exemplifies each time a
particular kind of pretense and comments on it. If pretense theorists are right,
the task of accounting for the real truth asserted with (1)–(3) does not require
to concede to realists that the speaker of (1)–(3) would be referring to fictional
characters: it is sufficient to admit that the speaker refers each time to partic-
ular kinds of pretense in which his audience and himself are engaged. 
For instance, in (1), while pretending to refer by means of the name “Sher-
lock Holmes”, the speaker really shows or indicates a kind of pretending to
refer. Then, adding the predicate “is a fictional character”, the speaker com-
ments on this kind of pretending to refer making it clear that it is only fictional
that he is referring to something with the name “Sherlock Holmes”.6 The
speaker of (1) may also, as the speaker uttering (2), be regarded as participat-
ing in an “unofficial” game of make-believe, a game in which there are two
kinds of people: “real” people and “fictional characters”. On this different con-
strual of (1), the speaker would be fictionally speaking the truth by fictionally
referring to something with the name “Sherlock Holmes” and pretending that
the words “is a fictional character” express a property. In making fictional of
himself that he speaks the truth in this unofficial game, the speaker of (1)
would be indicating that he is only pretending, in the official game authorised
by the work, to refer by means of the proper name “Sherlock Holmes”. In a
4 On “unofficial” games of make-believe, see Walton 1990, 406.
5 See also Walton 1990, 417.
6 Cf. Walton 1990, 422.
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different way, the speaker of (2) participates in the same unofficial game of
make-believe pretending that fictional characters have, like real people, a his-
tory of their own. The main difference between (1) and (2) lies in that fact that
the speaker of (2) deliberately betrays the unofficial game of make-believe by
using the phrase “the character Falstaff ” instead of the more neutral “Falstaff ”.
As for the speaker of (3), Walton described him either as being engaged in or
as speaking of various unofficial games of make-believe, like the game in
which to say that a character appears in a certain novel is, fictionally, to locate
a person in a certain realm. In both cases, the speaker of (3) would be, accord-
ing to Walton, referring to a kind of pretense.7
3. Realists and pretense theorists on discourse about fiction
Among language dependent realists, many admit along with pretense theorists
that discourse in fiction – by discourse in fiction, I mean the sentences that
are contained and uttered in works of fiction – involves a kind of pretense.
When an author uses sentences containing fictional names in writing the sto-
ries, many realists claim that she is engaged in a kind of pretense or that she
intends that her readers engage in a kind of pretense:
(…) [W]hen Dickens wrote, “Mrs. Bardell had fainted in Mr. Pickwick’s arms,” he
was not saying anything about someone called “Mrs. Bardell” or about someone
called “Mr. Pickwick”. He was not saying anything about them because he was not
saying anything about anything. What he was doing was crafting a linguistic object
that his readers could, in a certain sense, pretend was a record of the doings of –
among others – people called “Mrs. Bardell” and “Mr. Pickwick”. (van Inwagen,
1977, 73)8
The main difference between realists about fictional characters and antireal-
ists convinced by the virtue of pretense theory lies in the different ways they
analyze discourse about fiction. Thomasson, who is a language dependent
realist about fictional characters, claims that pretense theorists fail to take seri-
ous discourse about fictional characters as it is exemplified in (1)–(3) seri-
ously.
It certainly seems (…) that we sometimes step outside the pretense when we stop
pretending that there are really such people and animals and instead talk of them
straightforwardly as fictional characters that appear in stories, are created by authors,
thought about by readers, and so on. (Thomasson 1999, 97)
Realists insist that in discussing fiction, we are literally talking about a certain
part of the real world, the part which contains fictional objects and characters.
Discourse about fiction is, for the realists, discourse about reality, a reality
which includes more than flesh-and-blood people. Still Thomasson admits in
7 On (3), cf. Walton 1990, 416– 419.
8 See also Kripke 1973.
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the same paragraph that Walton is to be credited with revealing the central role
of pretense in much of our experience of and discourse about fiction. Thomas-
son labels “fictional contexts” those contexts of discourse about fiction where
pretense is involved and she concedes that, in “fictional contexts”, people
often pretend that what the story says is true.9 Another realist about fictional
characters, van Inwagen, relying on the distinction between story and history,
explains the occurrence of pretense in discourse about fiction in the follow-
ing way:
If authors in laying their stories before the public are, in a certain sense, pretending
to have produced histories, then it is not surprising that critics should at least some-
times pretend, in that sense, to be discussing histories. (van Inwagen 1983, 76)
If critics, introducing some pretense in their way of talking, imitate authors
(what they themselves are not), this is nothing more than a sign of their respect
for the conventions of literature which is the object of their study. The occur-
rence of pretense in their discourse about fiction does not manifest anything
else than their true respect for the conventions at work. 
In a different way, for Thomasson, the pretense involved in discourse about
fiction has only a stylistic function: it is a way for critics not to mention such
phrases as “according to the story”. There is here a source of disagreement
between realists like Thomasson and pretense theorists. Thomasson, after hav-
ing conceded to the pretense theorists that serious discourse about what goes
on in the story often involves pretense, claims, this time contra pretense the-
orists,10 that serious discourse about what is true in the story can be adequately
represented as involving a story operator. The statements made in “fictional
contexts” should always be understood, according to Thomasson, as implicitly
prefixed by a story operator. For instance, when a critic says:
“Hamlet is a prince”
pretending that what the story says is true, the appropriate reading of her
statement is:
“According to the (relevant) play, Hamlet is a prince”.
When uttered in a “fictional context”, the sentence “Hamlet is a prince” should
be read, according to Thomasson and contra pretense theorists, as genuinely
describing a state of affairs which, according to the relevant play, does obtain
and regards the existing fictional character Hamlet.11
Leaving aside the way Thomasson construes sentences about fiction uttered
in “fictional contexts”, it remains true that Thomasson and other realists agree
that pretense is involved in “fictional contexts” of discourse about fiction. The
9 Cf. Thomasson 1999, 97, 105.
10 See, e.g. Evans 1982, 364–365.
11 Cf. Thomasson 1999, 105–107.
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main source of disagreement between both camps concerns the next step, when
Thomasson adds that serious discourse about fiction does not always remain
at the level of “fictional contexts”. Discourse about fiction often occurs,
according to Thomasson, at the level of “real contexts”,12 “external claims
about fictional objects”,13 “real predications about fictional objects”.14 In “real
contexts” of discourse about fiction, one does not speak:
(…) from the internal perspective of what goes on in the story but from the external
critic’s perspective, speaking of these [creatures represented in the story] straightfor-
wardly as fictional characters, created by authors in particular circumstances, pro-
viding paradigms of the 19th century Romantic heroine, and so on. (Thomasson
1999, 106)
The pretense theorists’ main mistake is, for Thomasson, not to separate sharply
“fictional” and “real” contexts of discourse about fiction. On the basis of that
non-distinction, pretense theorist wrongly do not feel the need to postulate
existing fictional characters and run into major difficulties and useless com-
plexities when dealing with “real contexts” of discourse about fiction as
exemplified in (1)– (3):
Once we separate the two contexts in which claims about literature may occur and
allow that there are fictional characters to which we may refer, (…) the resolution to
the various difficulties surrounding fictional discourse is breathtakingly simple.
(Thomasson 1999, 106)
Here lies what is at stake between, on one side, many language dependent real-
ists like Thomasson and van Inwagen and, on the other side, pretense theorists
like Walton. For Walton, there is no way to follow the language dependent real-
ists and to separate sharply what Thomasson calls “fictional contexts” and “real
contexts” of discourse about fiction. For Walton, both contexts of discourse
about fiction rely on pretense and must be read as referring to kinds of pretense. 
Walton does not use Thomasson’s recent distinction between “fictional
contexts” and “real contexts” of discourse about fiction. But at least part of
what Thomasson says about “fictional contexts” of discourse about fiction
corresponds to what Walton describes as contexts where the speaker is
involved in the activity of “appreciation” while discussing fiction. In the activ-
ity of appreciation, Walton describes the speaker discussing fiction as “caught
up” in the spirit of the work he talks about, as “participating” in a game in
which the work he talks about is a prop.15 In the same way, at least part of what
12 Cf. Thomasson 1999, 106.
13 Cf. Thomasson 1999, 99.
14 Ibid.
15 As I have said above, pretense theorists are certainly not ready to follow Thomasson
and to read the statements the speaker makes while discussing fiction in “fictional contexts” as
prefixed with a story operator. I thank Alberto Voltolini for having reminded me of the limit of
the analogy I draw between Thomasson’s “fictional contexts” and Walton’s contexts of “appre-
ciation”. 
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Thomasson says about “real contexts” of discourse about fiction corresponds
to what Walton describes as contexts where the speaker is involved in the activ-
ity of “detached criticism” while discussing fiction. A speaker discussing fic-
tion in an activity of sober criticism or “cold academic analysis” is described
by Walton as considering the work she talks about and the games to be played
with it “from an onlooker’s point of view”, “from a perspective outside of it”.16
But Walton adds that it is not possible, contra Thomasson’s suggestion, to treat
separately the remarks people make in the course of engaging in the activities
of “appreciation” and “detached criticism”:
Appreciation and criticism, participation and observation, are not very separate. One
can hardly do either without doing the other, and nearly simultaneously. (…)
Appreciation and criticism are intimately intertwined. (Walton 1990, 394)17
Even the coldest and most detached discourse about fiction is, for Walton, a
way of continuing the pretense initiated by the author :
In pretending to refer by means of a name such as “Falstaff ” or “Santa Claus” or
“Oedipus”, speakers play along with, connive with, the pretense of the relevant fic-
tion or myth. To attach the predicate, “does not exist,” or “is a fictional character,” or
“is a mythical beast,” is to continue the pretense further, pretending to attribute a
property to the thing supposedly referred to, even while one actually declares the ref-
erence unsuccessful. (Walton 2000, 83)
Do then pretense theorists feel obliged to group discourse in fiction and dis-
course about fiction in the same category? If this were the case, this would
certainly be a damaging consequence of the pretense theory since it seems
obvious that what authors of fiction say when they write fictional sentences
cannot be equated with what critics say when they talk about fiction: whereas
critics literally assert genuine truths about fiction, authors of fiction just make
pretend assertions. Evans has traced the distinction between both kinds of dis-
course in Gricean terms. The difference between discourse in fiction and dis-
course about fiction is, for a pretense theorist like Evans, a matter of the pre-
suppositions about the intent of the speech act.18 If one admits, with Walton,
that to say (1)–(3) is to speak truly in the context of a certain unofficial game
of make-believe, then the difference between uttering (1)–(3) and sentences
uttered in fiction is that, in uttering (1)–(3), the speaker manifests her inten-
tion that her utterance should be up for as really correct or incorrect accord-
ing to whether or not the statement she makes is correct or incorrect in an unof-
ficial game of make-believe. By contrast, when Doyle, writing the stories, says
that Sherlock Holmes lives 221 B Baker Street, he has no such communica-
tive intentions. For a pretense theorist, although pretense is operative in both
16 Cf. Walton 1990, 392-393.
17 See also Evans 1982, 340, 353-63.
18 Cf. Evans 1982, 359.
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kinds of discourse, only discourse about fiction involves serious evaluative
intentions, the intentions to be evaluated as genuinely true or false. This is the
reason why to admit with pretense theorists that discourse about fiction
involves, as discourse in fiction, pretense does not entail that one should group
statements about fiction with statements in fiction in the same category. 
If what has just been said is right, it appears that the dispute between lan-
guage dependent realists and pretense theorists is at root a dispute within the
framework of the philosophy of language on the status of discourse about fic-
tion and only derivatively an ontological dispute. The only thing that radically
distinguishes language dependent realists and pretense theorists is that the for-
mer claim that absolutely no pretense is involved in discourse about fiction in
“real contexts” whereas the latter claim that even this kind of discourse relies
on pretense. More precisely, when one speaks, as in (1)– (3), of creatures rep-
resented in stories straightforwardly as fictional characters or as created by
authors in such and such circumstances, language dependent realists claim that
no pretense is involved, that one literally steps outside the pretense.19 How to
decide this issue?
4. The reflexivity of fictional narratives
I suggest that we leave the theoretical discussion and have a look at fictional
narratives themselves, the realm of discourse in fiction. Consider the follow-
ing:20
Leaving it [the coach] to pursue its journey at the pleasure of the conductor afore-
mentioned […] this narrative may embrace the opportunity of ascertaining the con-
dition of Sir Mulberry Hawk, and to what extent he had, by this time, recovered from
the injuries consequent on being flung violently from his cabriolet, under the cir-
cumstances already detailed. (Dickens, 1982, ch. 38, inside the chapter)
He stretched himself. He rose. He stood upright in complete nakedness before us,
and while the trumpets pealed Truth! Truth! We have no choice left but confess – he
was a woman.
The sound of the trumpets died away and Orlando stood stark naked. No human
being, since the world began, has ever looked more ravishing. […] Orlando looked
himself up and down in a long looking-glass, without showing signs of discompo-
sure, and went, presumably, to his bath. We may take advantage of this pause in the
narrative to make certain statements. Orlando has become a woman – there is no
denying it. (Woolf 1989 137-8)
Mrs. Tow-wouse […] began to compose herself, and at length recovered the usual
serenity of her temper, in which we will leave her, to open the reader the steps which
led to a catastrophe, common enough […] yet often fatal to the repose and well-being
of families, and the subject of many tragedies, both in life and on stage [i.e. adul-
tery]. (Fielding, Joseph Andrews I, xvii)
19 Cf. Thomasson 1999, 97
20 For the literary extracts mentioned below, I am indebted to Monica Fludernik’s talk
given at the Metalepsis conference in Paris in December 2002.
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As we have now brought Sophia into safe hands, the reader will, I apprehend, be con-
tented to deposit her awhile, and to look a little after other personages, and particu-
larly poor Jones, whom we have left long enough to do penance for his past offences,
which, as is the nature of vice, brought sufficient punishment upon him themselves.
(Fielding, Tom Jones, Book XI, end)
Fictional narratives, the realm of discourse in fiction, contain themselves, as
these examples amply illustrate, many instances of discourse about fiction. In
the first three extracts of Dickens, Woolf and Fielding, the narrator engages in
commenting on the events occurring in the fiction. In the last extract of Tom
Jones, the narrator talks to the reader about the fictional universe and its per-
sonages as personages: the narrator invites the reader to deposit one person-
age and to focus on another one. These are four instances of fictional narra-
tives where discourse about fiction is entirely intertwined with discourse in
fiction. Contrary to the traditional language dependent realist’s wisdom,21 crit-
ical literary theories are not the only ones to tell us that there are fictional
objects: stories themselves do tell us, at least within the scope of a pretense,
such things.
In these extracts, these bits of discourse about fiction – be they comments
on the narrated events or invitations for the narratee to leave such personage
and to look at another one – do not end or even interrupt the development of
discourse in fiction. These intrusions of discourse about fiction within dis-
course in fiction accompany the narrative in a smooth way and even, in many
cases, facilitate it. One may wonder whether these intrusions of discourse
about fiction inside fictional narratives are not the modern follow-ups of the
ancient formula like “Now leve we” or “Now turne we” one finds in mediae-
val narratives. Before the invention of chapters, mediaeval narratives used
standard formula like “Now leve we” or “Now turne we” to guide the reader
from one scene to another:
Now leve we sir Launcelot in joyus Ile wyth hys lady, dame Elayne and sir Percivayle
and sir Ector playyinge wyth them, and now turne we unto sur Bors de Ganys and
unto sur Lyonell that had sought sir Lancelot long, nye by the space of two yere, and
never coude they hyre of hym. (Malory 1971, 504)
Finally one could put forward the hypothesis that these quasi-intrusions of the
narrator or of the narratee into the narrated world are not a marginal feature
of fictional narratives but constitute a central property of narratives. Without
going as far, one should admit at least that fictional narratives have the reflex-
ive capacity of representing themselves as fictional – the capacity of speaking
of creatures they represent as fictional characters or as created by authors –
without stepping outside the pretense or breaking the rules of fiction. This con-
clusion goes against the language dependent realists’ claim that in such con-
21 See, e.g., van Inwagen 1983, 73.
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texts of discourse one would always need to step outside the pretense. In the
extracts mentioned, the narrator or the narratee is supposed to step into the nar-
rated world sometimes to comment on it, sometimes to focus on such and such
personage or scene. This, I believe, goes against the realist’s idea of a strict
separation between discourse in fiction and discourse about fiction. 
Realists often insist on the important distinction between the internal and
the external perspectives available in our talk about fictional objects. The inter-
nal perspective on fictional narratives is that of imaginative immersion in the
fictional world while the external perspective is an awareness of the artifice
of the narrated world. Realists claim that from the internal perspective, char-
acters are imagined to be actual persons possessing human qualities while
from the external perspective of the real world they are conceived as bearers
of literary properties such as being created by Doyle, first appearing on page
35,… But their mistake may be to believe that these perspectives cannot be
hold simultaneously, contrary to what the literary extracts mentioned above
suggest.
Fictional narratives require from the reader that he adopt both a point of
view from within the world of the story, an internal point of view and an exter-
nal point of view, the perspective of the author (or of the narrator) of the story.
There is no such thing as a total or complete imaginative involvement of the
reader into the narrated world. Reading the literary extracts mentioned above
in which the narrator or the narratee literally enters into the narrated world do
not create any unease in the reader’s mind or any feeling of transgression. It
does not seem that the narrator or the narratee violates an ontological bound-
ary while intervening in the fiction to comment on it. In fictional narratives,
metafictional passages are often embedded in fictional passages – or the other
way round – without in any way disrupting the fictional involvement of the
reader. It is as if the reader was already, maybe in a tacit way, attentive to the
literary properties of the work, already considering the history as a story made
of a narrator and personages, when the narrator fictionally addresses him. Let’s
quote Walton:
We, as it were, see Tom Sawyer both from inside his world and from outside of it.
And we do so simultaneously. (…) The dual standpoint which appreciators take is
(…) one of the most fundamental and important features of the human institution of
fiction. (Walton 1978, 21)
The nature of our imaginative engagement in fiction with its dual aspect is
something that language dependent realists do not really take into account:
already at the first level of discourse in fiction, the reader immersed in the fic-
tion still knows that what he or she reads is not history but a fictional story.
The fictive stance is a dual awareness: the awareness of the world of the story
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with its flesh-and-blood creatures living their lives by themselves, and the aware-
ness of the literary work as such, including the linguistic origin of its characters.
This dual awareness explains why the reader may be aware that in a fictional
narrative the same subject may be a strong person and a weak character, a very
exceptional person and, at the same time, a conventional character. These are not
contradictory judgments but different aspects of a twofold subject. 
5. “Metalepsis” in critical discourse: a problem for language dependent real-
ists
Recently, Genette has labeled “metalepsis” the intrusions of the narrator or
narratee  into the narrated world exemplified in the literary extracts mentioned
above.22 Metalepsis is defined as:
[…] any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the diegetic universe
(or by diegetic characters into a metadiegetic universe, etc.), or the inverse (as in
Cortazar)[…] (Genette 1980, 234-235)23
A very similar intrusion, a metafictional “metalepsis”, is at work when, say, a
literary critic writes:
(4) “Vergil has Dido die at Book IV of The Aeneid.” 
Here, the critic has a serious intent and there is a sense in which an utterance of
(4) would be true. This is the main difference with the metafictional “metalep-
sis” mentioned in the literary extracts of Dickens, Woolf and Fielding which, at
least for some of them, are not used in a non fictional intent. Still the critic uses
the “metaleptic” fiction of the intrusion of Vergil into the fictional world of Dido
to say what she could have said in a non “metaleptic” way like in:
(4’) “Vergil organised The Aeneid in such a way that his character Dido
left the narrative at Book IV.”
A critic has at his disposal many different ways and manners to discuss fic-
tion. One such manner is the theoretical one exemplified in (1)– (3) and in (4’)
and, at the other extreme of a continuum, the same critic might have chosen
to say (4) instead of (4’).24 In the light of this, it seems that the pretense theo-
22 Note that I disagree with Genette 1980, 234–235 when he describes these intrusions
as transgressions. According to me, these intrusions manifest, at the level of discourse in fic-
tion, the dual awareness characteristic of the fictional stance.
23 The diegesis of a narrative is its entire created world, the time-space continuum
described by the story which is told. Any narrative includes a diegesis. But Genette distin-
guishes among diegetic narratives (the primary story told); metadiegetic narratives (stories told
by a character inside a diegetic narrative); and extradiegetic narratives (stories that frame the
primary story told). Cf. Genette 1980.
24 Walton gives an example of a statement concerning fiction very close to (4): “Oscar
Wilde killed off Dorian Gray by putting a knife through his heart.” (Walton 1990, 409) In
Walton’s example, the intrusion of the author in the narrated world is even more explicit than
in (4).
08_Pelletier Jérôme  02.02.2004  13:38 Uhr  Seite 201
202 Jérôme Pelletier
rist has an advantage over the language dependent realist: whereas the pretense
theorist is in a position to give an account of the truth expressed by both (4)
and (4’), the realist theorist who is in a position, via the postulation of an ontol-
ogy of fictional characters, to explain the truth of (4’), might have difficulties
to explain (4).
For a pretense theorist, (4) and (4’) taken literally do not express any propo-
sition since “Dido”, in both sentences, has no reference. Once (4) or (4’) are
understood as relying on the interplay of various unofficial games of make-
believe – the critic pretends to assert a proposition, she pretends that Vergil
has literally killed Dido, she pretends that there are fictional characters… –
(4) or (4’) may be understood by the pretense theorist as expressing a truth in
the context of these unofficial games of make-believe. 
A language dependent realist might be tempted to say that (4) is really true
with respect to a “fictional context”, while (4’) is really true with respect to a
“real context”.25 However, this move creates other difficulties. First of all,
statements made in “fictional contexts” like “Hamlet is a prince” are under-
stood as implicitly describing what is true according to the story.26 And it is at
least doubtful that one could consider that it is true in the story of the Aeneid
that Vergil has Dido die. The only way out for the language dependent realist
would then be to include in the so-called “fictional contexts” unofficial games
of make-believe. But this move would certainly endanger the realist’s project
of  demarcating clearly between “fictional” and “real” contexts of discourse
about fiction: once unofficial games of make-believe are included into “fic-
tional contexts” of discourse about fiction, it is not easy to see what is left for
“real contexts” of discourse about fiction. 
A language dependent realist insists on sentences like (4’) while a pretense
theorist insists on sentences like (4) to make her points. Both theorists agree
that (4) and (4’) have a serious intent and that they are true metafictional sen-
tences. Both theorists agree that (4) involves some degree of pretense. The dif-
ference between the realist and the pretense theorist lies in the fact that the
realist does not bring in pretense to give an account of (4’). The question one
would like to ask to the language dependent realist is whether or not she admits
that both (4) and (4’) have the same core meaning or may be used to assert the
same content. If this is the case, the language dependent realist needs to give
an account of the content asserted with (4) without endangering her distinc-
tion between “fictional” and “real” contexts of discourse about fiction. If this
is not the case, the realist must then show where lie the meaning differences
between (4) and (4’).
25 I owe this suggestion to Alberto Voltolini.
26 See above.
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Conclusion
Language dependent realist claim that critical discourse breaks the rules of fic-
tion, it creates a barrier between fictional discourse and itself: it is a way of
stepping out of the fiction while discussing fiction. To this picture of critical
discourse and on the basis of the meaning similarities between (4) and (4’),
one may oppose – and I think this is the gist of the pretense theorist’s move –
that our understanding of (1)–(3) depends on our grasping the fact that these
statements do not break the rules of fiction but, only, of ‘normal’ fiction.
Speaking in a critical or theoretical manner as in (1)–(3) is a way to draw our
attention to the rules of ‘normal’ fiction without breaking the rules of fiction.
And to draw attention to the rules of ‘normal’ fiction never ends fiction: it is
more the work of a meta-fiction, not the end of fiction.
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